ABSTRACT: Before searching people or property, police need "probable cause." In United States v. Place, the Supreme Court held that dog sniffs of vehicles, stopped for lawful purposes, are not a search. Lower courts have held that a positive alert by a trained narcotics dog can establish probable cause for a search of the car. Many courts use the fraction of positive identifications in which drugs were found to assess the reliability of the dog, and thus to decide whether the alert established probable cause. In the medical test literature, this summary statistic is called the predictive value of a positive test (PVP). By itself, it does not measure the accuracy of the sniffs or medical test. There are two components to assessing the accuracy of a dog sniff or test. These are the probability that the dog sniff correctly classifies an item containing contraband as having it and the probability the sniff correctly exonerates an item not containing contraband. The PVP depends on both these probabilities and on the prevalence of contraband in the places the dog has examined. The same PVP can arise when (1) an accurate dog sniffs items with a low prevalence of contraband and (2) a much less accurate dog examines items with a high prevalence of drugs. It is mathematically impossible to estimate the two accuracy rates of a narcotics dog from the field performance data typically submitted by the state to show the narcotics dog is reliable. The problem arises because one needs three equations to estimate the prevalence and the two accuracy rates but the data only provide two. These issues will be illustrated on data from cases. Furthermore, the number of test sniffs in many certifications is too small to provide a statistically reliable measure of the dog's accuracy and the prevalence of drugs in the items sniffed is usually at least 50%. Rather than continuing to rely on an inappropriate measure of the accuracy of dog sniffs, courts should require more information concerning the accuracy of dogs in their training sessions, certifications, and in the field. In conjunction with obtaining better information on the prevalence of drugs in commonly occurring settings-such as vehicles stopped for routine traffic violations or items examined after police have received a "tip"-having access to dog accuracy rates would provide the legal system with sufficient information to estimate both measures of accuracy of a narcotics dog and its PVP, which would assist courts in determining whether the police had probable cause. *Department of Statistics, George Washington University (jlgast@gwu.edu). Acknowledgements: It is a pleasure to thank Professor Edward K. Cheng, Professor David H. Kaye, Dr. Barry I. Graubard, and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions and Drs. Kristen Meier and Gregory Campbell of the FDA for providing the updated guidelines for evaluating diagnostic and screening tests.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. Before police can search one's home or property, they need "probable cause." The Supreme Court has deliberately refrained from giving a quantitative, probabilistic interpretation of "probable cause" as its meaning is context dependent.
1 Law enforcement officers are allowed to have a trained narcotics dog walk around a vehicle to check for illegal drugs after they have legitimately stopped a driver for traffic or other violation. 2 The original stop of the automobile must be based on articulable facts that give rise to at least reasonable suspicion and not be a pretext, 3 and the dog sniff must not unduly extend the time of the stop. 4 However, reasonable suspicion that there is contraband in the car is not required for a dog sniff outside the vehicle.
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Most courts have held that an alert or indication of the presence of contraband in luggage or a vehicle by a trained drug dog suffices to establish probable cause to search the vehicle. 6 Proof of the dog's ability to accurately detect drugs should be required. 7 Courts have assumed that this showing can be made with a single statistic. For example, an alert by a properly trained and reliable 1. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) , the Court noted that probable cause is a fluid concept that depends on the assessment of probabilities by individuals trained in law enforcement. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) .
2. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983), the Court held that a "dog sniff" of luggage is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. However, it reversed the defendant's conviction because of the length of time (90 minutes) he was detained. Cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (noting that the time it took for the dog to walk around the car twice did not substantially extend the duration of an automobile stop). For the initial stop to be legitimate, police must have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic or other offense has been committed. E.g., United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the officer initially approached a disabled truck to offer assistance).
3. In United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149, 152 (10th Cir. 1992) the checking of driver's licenses and vehicle registration, which was the legal justification for the roadblock, was pretextual because the primary reason was to check for drugs in the vehicle and the evidence was suppressed. See also United States v. Ibarra, 345 F.3d 711, 712-13 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that an otherwise reasonable stop for speeding that was made as a pretext to investigate the driver for drug activity did not make the stop unreasonable; following the car was part of a coordinated plan with DEA agents from Washington and Oregon, who were investigating groups making drugs in Seattle and believed the car would be taking drugs to San Jose).
4 9 the Seventh Circuit stated that a dog whose identifications led to the finding of drugs 62% of the time was sufficiently reliable. That opinion noted that any percentage over 50% would meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which is stricter than probable cause. 10 In South Dakota v. Nguyen, 11 the defendant's expert, a former canine handler and trainer, testified that the dog should not be considered reliable because in over half of the times that he indicated that he smelled a drug odor; drugs were not found in the subsequent searches. Critics of the Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois v. Caballes 12 that permitted suspicionless sniffs of properly detained vehicles have argued that the accuracy of dog identifications is too low to justify treating the preliminary sniff as anything less than a search requiring case-specific probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. 13 Given the importance of the accuracy rates of the dog who alerts in assessing whether probable cause for a search exists, it is important that these rates are properly understood. Using a dog trained to sniff out drugs (or explosives) serves as a "screening test" identifying when a further search should be conducted. It is analogous to a medical screening test that tells a doctor when a more accurate and expensive confirmatory test of the patient should be carried out.
14 In that context, two statistical measures are used to express the accuracy of such tests, the probability an individual with the disease is correctly diagnosed (sensitivity) and the probability a disease-free individual is correctly diagnosed (specificity). These two measures are used in many other disciplines and have been recognized and explained in the legal literature on scientific evidence. 15 Yet, in the dog-detection cases the courts often rely on a different statistical measure. 16 This quantity is the predictive value of a positive (PVP) screening test. The PVP, standing alone, is a problematic and insufficient measure of accuracy. This problem will be illustrated on the data of the dog's 8. 25 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1994 accuracy in Nguyen. The incompleteness of the data relating to the dog's accuracy and reliability in other cases will also be demonstrated by showing that the same numerical value of the PVP may arise from an accurate or an unreliable dog, depending on the prevalence of contraband in the vehicles (or other containers) the dog has examined as well as their ability to classify items containing or not containing contraband correctly.
In Part I the basic statistical model used in the analysis of screening test data is summarized. 17 The predictive value of a screening test depends on the prevalence of the disease or trait in the population being screened as well as the accuracy rates of the test. When a population of individuals (cars) with a very low prevalence of a disease (contraband) is screened even a very accurate test can have a relatively low PVP; although the prevalence of the disease (contraband) among those identified by the screening test is noticeably larger than in the original population. Similarly, amongst those members of that same population whose screening test (dog sniff) is negative; the prevalence of the trait (called PVN) is much lower than in the original population. The model is applied to the data on the accuracy of the narcotics dog in Nguyen and other cases in Part II.
Under the reasonable assumption that the proportion of all drivers stopped for traffic violations that are carrying illegal drugs is rather small (for example, less than 10%), 18 it will be seen that a dog with the same PVP (46%) as the dog in Nguyen could have high accuracy rates. On the other hand if the prevalence of drugs in cars the dog sniffed was higher, for example, around 30%, the estimate of prevalence from the data in Nguyen the dog would have a similar PVP, but would incorrectly identify about 40% of innocent people as having drugs in their vehicles. Statistics from similar cases also support the accuracy of trained narcotics dogs under some circumstances, but are less supportive in others. A more detailed analysis of a brief submitted in a case where the prevalence was estimated to be quite small is given in Appendix A. On the other hand, when a dog is certified the primary focus is on only one of the two accuracy rates: the sensitivity or the probability a dog identifies a location that contains drugs. 19 The specificity or the probability that it does not 19. The detection standards of the National Narcotic Detector Dog Association describe the certification test for determining proficiency and reliability. NAT'L NARCOTIC DETECTOR DOG ASS'N, NARCOTIC DETECTION STANDARDS 1 (2008), available at, http://www.nndda.org/docman/ doc_view/2-narcotics-detection-standard?tmpl=component&format=raw. Two stashes of each narcotic that the dog is trained to detect will be placed in an area not exceeding 1000 square feet, indicate that drugs are in a "clean" location is rarely examined carefully. Only one of the standards of six certification agencies incorporates false positive identifications in its passing guidelines. 20 Part I shows that the specificity plays an important role in the formula for the PVP, which has been used in most jurisdictions to assess whether the dog is sufficiently reliable and that a positive alert meets the "probable cause" standard.
Estimation of the accuracy measures of screening tests from their results in actual practice is subject to more constraints in the legal context than in health care. In medicine, the accuracy of the screening test on individuals who test negative can be checked by giving a random sample of them a further confirmatory test. 21 This enables researchers in the health-related fields to estimate the specificity of the test. This is questionable in the legal setting as searching a vehicle that a trained dog had not identified as containing drugs could violate the Fourth Amendment as the police would not have a reasonable suspicion, much less "probable cause."
22 Indeed, a car that "passed" a sniff test by a well-trained, reliable dog would now have a lower probability of containing drugs than a randomly selected vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.
There are other differences between the use of screening texts in medicine and the use of narcotics dogs by police officers. In the medical application, one often has a good estimate of the prevalence of the disease or infection screened for in the particular subpopulation. For example the prevalence of HIV in blood donors whose donation is screened for HIV is reported every two weeks, so blood banks can check that it remains very low. The prevalence of colon cancer in patients, between forty and fifty years of age, receiving a routine colonoscopy is also low, however, the prevalence of the same cancer in patients of the same age who were sent for a colonoscopy because they had symptoms or a fecal occult blood test that found blood in their stools, would be higher. Analogously, the same narcotics dog may be used to screen vehicles which will have a section with each of the drugs. The judges are informed of the type of response the dog will give when it detects a narcotic. To be certified the dog can only give one negative response (presumably when there were drugs in the section). Notice that there is no subarea that is deliberately left without a drug to estimate the false-positive rate. Similarly, to meet the certification requirements in Illinois, 90% of the alerts made by a dog must be correct, so no more than 10% can be false. 21. Almost all individuals classified as positive by the screening test are given a confirmatory test before treatment is initiated. For infections such as HIV, the confirmatory Western Blot test is based on a blood sample, however, even in the medical context, if the confirmatory test involves a biopsy or surgical procedure, it may not be ethical to expose a random sample of individuals whose screening test was negative to it.
22. In United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1995), the officers searched a car after a dog sniff did not identify drugs. Even though the officers found drugs, the Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. Other facts in the case, such as the defendant was locked in the backseat of the police car also entered into the decision. But see State v. Alexander, Ohio App. 3d 590, 604 (2003) (allowing a search after a dog sniff was negative). 53 JURIMETRICS in both high and low prevalence settings. An example of a moderately high prevalence situation occurred when drivers took a little used exit to get off an interstate highway to avoid an announced but nonexistent drug checkpoint.
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Courts may not fully appreciate the fact that a narcotics dog having a good track record, or high PVP, as a result of examining with a moderate-high prevalence of drugs, may have a much lower PVP when sniffing a very low prevalence population. Thus, when the state indicates that a seemingly high percentage, for example, 75% of the time the dog alerted, contraband was found, one needs a good estimate of the prevalence of drugs in the set of items the dog sniffed to give the statistic its appropriate evidentiary weight. It is much easier for a dog that was primarily used to investigate places where the police had prior knowledge, for example, from an informant or partially corroborated citizen's tip, to have a high PVP, than a dog who has been used to screen in low prevalence settings. For example, if a dog with sensitivity of .90 and a specificity of .80 screens locations with a high prevalence, say 50% of contraband, the dog's PVP will be 81.8%, which means about 82% of the items the dog indicates contain drugs will actually have them. If the same dog is used to screen items with low prevalence of drugs, say 1%, the PVP will only be 4.35%, which indicates that fewer than 5% of the items the dog alerts on will actually contain drugs. If courts required the state to present information on the dog's sensitivity and specificity, one could determine the PVP most relevant to the facts of each case.
Part III describes a simple decision-theoretic model indicating that the Court is sensible when it eschews from issuing a formal quantitative standard for "probable cause." 24 One can regard the decision to search a vehicle on the basis of a dog sniff as balancing the trade-offs between the added inconvenience and potential embarrassment to the erroneously searched citizens against the gain to the general public and society of catching a criminal. The relative costs involved will vary according to the seriousness of the crime, the risk to society of failing to detect the contraband and arrest its possessor, the proportion of all searches that will be carried out on vehicles not containing contraband and the time they take. 695-96 (1996) at 695-96, the court noted that the precise definition or quantification of the meaning of "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" is not possible. Rather, it depends on whether the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. This context dependent interpretation was reinforced by the Court in 
I. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR EVALUATING SCREENING TESTS
In medical applications, the purpose of a screening test is to determine whether a person belongs to the class ( ) of individuals having a specific disease or in the class ( ) not having it. The set of individuals identified by the test as having the disease is denoted by and the complementary set of individuals the tests indicates do not have the disease by . In the dog sniffing situation, the class consists of those drivers who are stopped for a traffic violation who have illegal drugs (or the specific contraband being screened for) and the set consists of the vehicles identified by the dog as containing the drug or contraband. Again the complementary sets are denoted by and . The subset of individuals who have the disease (drugs) and are correctly classified belong to both D and S. This subset is called their intersection; ∩ . The probability of belonging to the set D given that a screening test (dog sniff) is positive is called the conditional probability of D given that S has occurred and is denoted by P [D|S] . The accuracy of a test is specified by two conditional probabilities:
= the probability a person with the disease or whose vehicle contains drugs is correctly classified or P[Dog indicates drugs are present|drugs are present] is referred to as the sensitivity of the test and = the probability a disease-free individual is correctly classified as not having the disease or P[Dog indicates drugs are not present| drugs are not present], called the specificity of the test.
In this context, the dog's sensitivity is the probability that a vehicle containing the drug or contraband screened for is identified by the dog. The dog's specificity is the probability that a vehicle not containing the drug or contraband is not indicated as containing drugs. A probability of interest is P[Drugs are present| Dog indicates drugs are present] as this denotes the fraction of alerts the dog makes where drugs are found. This is called the PVP. In the medical context, the PVP is the probability that an individual classified as having the disease actually has the disease. This probability is given by
where D S means that the individual (vehicle) has the disease (drugs) and is correctly identified as having it. 25. For further details along with a discussion of the "sampling error" of the PVP when estimated from a study, see Gastwirth, supra note 17, at 214.
Notice that the formula for the PVP depends on the prevalence (π) and accuracy measures, sensitivity and specificity. To illustrate the importance of the prevalence, let us consider a very accurate test having sensitivity (η) and specificity (θ) equal to .99. The test only misclassifies 1% of the individuals (cars) with the disease (drugs) and 1% of the individuals (cars) that are disease-(drug)free. Suppose the test in a population with a fairly high prevalence is used, say π = .20. The ,
which implies that almost all (96%) of the individuals (vehicles) identified as having the disease (drugs) actually do. Now suppose one screens a population with a very low prevalence, say π = .001, corresponding to the situation when one screens a healthy population for a disease or tests a random sample of vehicles on the road for drugs as when police create a roadblock to control drunk driving. Now the PVP equals . .
. . . .
=
, implying that less than 10% of those identified as having the trait screened for actually have it. In the context of a legitimate roadblock 26 or a school-wide search of all students, these results mean that over 90% of the individuals searched will not have drugs.
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Because dogs are trained to signal an alert if they smell a particular contraband, if a vehicle contained the substance recently and the smell lingers, the dog will identify the vehicle. 28 Hence, the expected specificity (θ) of the dog in the field would be less than the sensitivity (η). This effect will be illustrated by calculating the PVP for the same values of prevalence (π) considered above when θ = .97. When π is .20, the PVP equals .892 indicating that nearly 90% of the vehicles identified will actually contain drugs. However, when the prevalence is .001 the PVP equals .032 or about 3%, a noticeable decrease from the situation when the specificity equaled .99 and 9% of the screened 26. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) the Court disapproved of a roadblock designed to check a predetermined number of drivers for drugs, stating that the "Court has never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." The decision noted that it had approved a brief suspicionless search at a sobriety checkpoint to detect drunk drivers in Michigan Dep 28. Indeed, in the Nguyen opinion reports many instances where there is an explanation of why the dog was misled, for example, the driver admitted to dropping off drugs or to using drugs earlier in the day. .00099 .0902 .01098 = positives were true positives. These calculations show that after screening a population with a very low prevalence with a very accurate test, a small minority of those identified as positive (having the disease or carrying drugs) will actually be truly positive. The dependence of the PVP on the prevalence of contraband in the items sniffed illustrates why it is difficult to set a minimum value of the PVP that would correspond, even approximately, to "probable cause." In Table 1 , the PVP is reported as well as its complementary measure, the Predictive Value of a Negative test (PVN), when testing a population with prevalence ranging from .001 to .30 with a screening test with accuracies η = .99 and θ = .97. The very low values of the PVN (the prevalence of individuals with the trait amongst those who screen negative) in the rightmost column of the table show that screening is useful in public health as the PVN is noticeably lower than the prevalence of the trait in the population screened. In the early stages of the HIV/AIDS epidemic when the prevalence of the infection was very low, screening the blood supply substantially reduced the transmission of the disease. The first row of Table 1 implies that if 1 in a 1000 members of the donor pool had the infection, out of every 100,000 units that "passed" the screening test only 32 units would have the infection. Thus, screening the blood supply surely reduces the number of "transfusion-related" cases of HIV/AIDS. 29 Notice that screening identified 100(1-η)% or 99% of the population having the disease or infection. On the other hand, the PVP of .032 means that 96.8% of individuals who screened positive will worry needlessly until they receive the results of a confirmatory test.
The results in Table 1 also illustrate how important the prevalence is in determining the PVP. When the test is used to screen a population with prevalence .025 or 1 in 40, the PVP is .458, but if the prevalence is .05, the PVP increases to .635. Given the limited information about the prevalence of contraband in the items a narcotics dog has screened, it is unlikely that one will know its value to within a margin of error of .025.
When the specificity of the screening test is less than .97, say θ = .80, in the low prevalence situation (π = .001) the PVP of a test with very high sensitivity, .99, is only .005, so 99.5% of those identified will not have the trait screened for. Because of the lower specificity of the test now those who screen positive are only 5 times more likely than a randomly selected individual to have the trait. In this low prevalence situation, it is questionable whether a probability less than .01 or 1% that someone has contraband is a "fair probability" that should give an officer "probable cause" to search a vehicle. Thus, the proper interpretation of a positive indication by a dog-sniff or other screening test requires knowledge of both the sensitivity and specificity of the test and the prevalence of contraband in the population of items the dog has screened. If the probability of the vehicle or item containing drugs in the particular case differs substantially from the prevalence in the objects the dog has examined, then the PVP should be calculated for the case-specific facts. Note: More decimal places for the PVN because it is very small when the specificity of the screening test is very high.
Comment: Although lawyers may question the usefulness of screening a very low prevalence population, where the proportion of positive identifications that are true is small, 30 for example, the case in the first two rows of Table 1, in the area of public health such testing is quite useful. In addition to the blood screening example, suppose individuals with a rare genotype (prevalence = .001) had a ten-fold increased risk of a cancer if they were exposed to a particular chemical (at home or at work). Using a screening test with the accuracy rates assumed in Table 1 , implies that 3.2% of those identified as possible carriers would truly be at increased risk. The individuals who screened positive would receive a more precise genetic test to identify the true carriers, who could then minimize their future exposure to the chemical. If one believes that an officer has "probable cause" to search a vehicle they stopped if the vehicle was substantially more likely to contain contraband than a typical car, even in the rare prevalence case of line 1 of Table 1 , the probability a vehicle a dog has identified is 32 times more likely to contain contraband than a typical vehicle might be legally meaningful. 31. Whether such an increase in probability suffices to establish "reasonable cause" is a legal, not statistical, question. In Part III, the relative gains and losses of the possible actions in the particular context should be considered. For example, it is far more important to detect an individual transporting anthrax than one with a small amount of marijuana. π π
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATISTICAL RESULTS

A. The Importance of the Prevalence of Drugs in the Items
Screened and the Specificity of the Screening Test
To further illustrate the role of the prevalence (π) in determining the value of the PVP, suppose one classifies individuals by a coin toss. Half the time one makes the correct decision and half the time one is incorrect. This means that both the sensitivity and specificity = .5, which indicates that one-half of the vehicles with drugs are correctly identified and one-half of the vehicles without drugs are correctly identified. Substituting these values in formula (1) shows that the PVP = π, the prevalence of drugs in the original population screened. This makes sense because one-half of the vehicles with drugs will be classified as having them and one-half of the vehicles without drugs will be classified as having them, so the proportion of vehicles with drugs among those classified as containing them will be the same as the proportion of vehicles containing drugs in the set of vehicles screened. Notice that this clearly uninformative screening procedure (or poorly trained dog who alerts at random) will have a PVP of at least .50, whenever the prevalence of drugs in the items searched is at least .50. Thus, solely relying on the PVP of a narcotics dog exceeding any preset value to assess "probable cause" may lead to searching the property of many innocent people.
Most cases use the PVP-the proportion of vehicles identified by the dog that the subsequent search shows did contain drugs as the measure of the dog's accuracy. 32 The case of United States v. Kennedy concerned a warrant to search suitcases after a dog gave an alert. 33 The dog's approximately 71% accuracy rate is also cited in Justice Souter's dissent in Illinois v. Caballes.
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This figure is based on the fact that in only 40 of 56 positive identifications the dog made were drugs actually found, which shows that 71.4% is the PVP rather than either the sensitivity or specificity, which are the proper measures of the accuracy of a screening test. No information is provided about the number of times the dog gave "no indication" as the officer did not keep records of the dog's performance in the field nor in training sessions.
A month after the alert, the dog was recertified with a success rate of 96%. The "success rate" of the dog in the recertification process corresponds to the sensitivity of the dog, and if it is assumed that the specificity of the dog has the same value, then an accuracy rate of 71.4% indicates that the prevalence of drugs in the screened population is .094 or just below 10%. This is much higher than one expects in the general population; however, a confidential source informed the Drug Enforcement officer that the suspect in Kennedy had behaved in a way consistent with someone involved in the drug trade. Presumably, the prevalence of drugs or contraband in individuals who have been identified in this way is much higher than in the general population. If a large proportion of the dog's investigation of other suitcases or cars were triggered by similar "tips" or additional information, a prevalence of 9.14% of drugs in the items the dog "sniffed" would be reasonable. Thus, the accuracy rate (that is, PVP) noted by Justice Souter is consistent with the performance of an accurate screening test applied to a population with a low to moderate prevalence of the disease or contraband.
On the other hand, if one believed that the prevalence of drugs in the items the dog in Kennedy sniffed was 1% and his sensitivity equaled .96, in order for the dog to have a PVP of 71.4%, his specificity would need to equal .996. This is an implausibly high specificity; especially as the state often argues that false positives occur because the dogs are trained to detect the odor of drugs, which can linger for some time.
The critics of relying on "dog sniffs" often cite the data from Merrett v. Moore, 35 which concerned a two-day Florida roadblock in which about 1450 cars were checked for proper documentation (driver's license, registration) and narcotics. Of the 1450 cars, the dogs indicated that 28 had drugs but only one actually did. Because a roadblock checks all drivers, the vast majority of whom were not violating the traffic laws and probably not carrying illegal drugs the fraction cars that contained illegal substances was very small. The low PVP of 1/28 = .0357 or under 5% is actually quite consistent with screening a low prevalence (π = .001) population with a screening test with very high sensitivity (.99) and a specificity around .97 (see the first row of Table 1 ).
Assuming that the prevalence of drugs in the cars in Merrett was .001, as before, and they were screened by narcotics dogs with sensitivity .99 and a seemingly acceptable specificity of .90, the PVP would decline to .0068 or less than 1%. Then, 145 cars without drugs would have been searched in addition to the one that contained drugs.
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B. The South Dakota v. Nguyen Case
After she followed a car too closely for a while, Ms. Nguyen was stopped by a highway patrol officer. He asked her to sit in the passenger seat of his patrol car while he carried out the usual background check of the validity of the license and registration. He also informed her that a drug detection dog was in the back seat of his car. The dog soon indicated that he detected the odor of drugs, so the officer walked the dog around the car while waiting for the results of the background check. The dog indicated that drugs were present and the officer, along with another trooper who had arrived at the scene, searched the car. Two duffel bags containing individually wrapped packages 35. 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995). 36. A specificity of .90 means that the narcotics dogs will erroneously classify 10% of the cars not containing drugs as having them.
of marijuana, totaling 53.94 pounds were found. During the proceedings, the reliability of the dog and whether the trooper had probable cause to search her car were raised. The trial court found that "probable cause" was established by an objectively observable indication of a properly trained and certified narcotics dog.
The defendant's expert noted that the trooper conducted 183 "hand searches" because Kaz, his narcotics dog, indicated the odor of a controlled substance but found drugs in only 84 of them. Thus, the expert stated that the 99 erroneous indications meant that the dog's error rate was 54% or equivalently the dog's PVP is 46%. The opinion also reported the statistics on the dog's sniffing the exterior of a single automobile, which are more pertinent to the case. Out of 189 searches, Kaz indicated drugs in 114 cars but drugs were found in 60. In 75 instances the dog gave no indication. For single car searches, the PVP of the dog is 60/114 = 52.6%. Although the expert called these figures the dog's accuracy; the proper measures of the accuracy of a screening method are its sensitivity and specificity. The PVP depends on the prevalence of the trait in the population screened in addition to the two measures of accuracy.
It is difficult to select an appropriate value or range of values for the prevalence in Nguyen because the dog identified the driver as having drugs before the car was searched. If it is assumed that the prevalence of drugs hidden in cars that were stopped for a traffic violation is low, say .001 to .02, it is reasonable to believe that the prevalence (π) of drugs in cars, whose drivers had the odor of drugs, might be in the range .05-.20. Assuming a prevalence of .10 and Kaz was quite accurate, with a sensitivity of .99 and specificity of .97, formula (1) yields a PVP of .786 or just below 80%. If the prevalence of drugs in the vehicles searched was only .05, the PVP is 63.46%. If the dog's specificity were only .95 rather than .97, which means that 95% of innocent subjects are correctly classified, and the prevalence remained at .05 the dog's PVP would be 51.03%. Thus, the PVP of 46% in Nguyen is consistent with a situation where a very accurate dog has been used to screen vehicles where the prevalence of illegal substances is not very high (5%) but not extremely low. Later, it will be seen that the same PVP is also consistent with a less accurate dog screening a high prevalence population.
The calculations presented so far have assumed that both the sensitivity and specificity of the dog are quite high (>.95). The data in Nguyen suggest that the specificity of the dog was not in that range. Recall that in 189 sniffs of vehicles, in 75 or 39.68%, the dog gave no indication, in 60 or 31.75% the dog gave an indication and drugs were found, while in 54 or 28.57% the dog gave an indication but no drugs were found. 37 These data are consistent with a high 37. The opinion in State v. Nguyen, 726 N.W.2d 871, 877 (S.D. 2007) reports that in many instances when an indication was given but no drugs were found a note is included mentioning that the person whose car was identified was a drug user or dealer, so the dog might well have detected a residual odor. Thus, the dogs were detecting the odor of the illegal drug or drugs they were trained for even though the vehicle did not contain drugs. sensitivity but only modest specificity. This follows from the following calculations: Using the probability model described in Part I, the probability the dog gives an indication and the car contains drugs is πη, the probability the dog does not give an indication of drugs is π(1-η) + (1-π)θ, and the probability an indication is given but drugs are not found is (1-π)(1-θ) . By equating these values to .3175, .3968, and .2875, respectively one can obtain values of the three unknown parameters, π, η, and θ; that is, one needs to find values of the prevalence (π), sensitivity (η) and specificity (θ) satisfying:
π(1-η) +(1-π)θ = .3968; πη = .3175 and (1-π)(1-θ) = .2875.
One cannot solve the equations in (3) for a unique set of parameter values because the three proportions sum to one. Indeed, one can show that the three equations reduce to two: πη = .3175 and π+θ = 1.4268.
(4)
Thus, one has only two equations but three unknown parameters (π, η, θ), so a unique solution does not exist.
To illustrate the mathematical implications, first assume the dog has perfect sensitivity, so η = 1 and πη = π = .3175. Now π(1-η) + (1-π)θ = 0 + .6825θ = .3968 or θ = .5814. Thus, the specificity of the dog is just under 60%, far less than the sensitivity. If one assumes that the sensitivity of the dog is η = .95, then π = .3175/.95 = .3342. The equation for θ becomes .0167+.6658θ =. 3968, yielding θ = .5709. Thus, the data in Nguyen is consistent with screening a population with a substantial prevalence, around one-third. Indeed, because the maximum value of the sensitivity η is 1.0, the fact that πη = .3175 implies that the prevalence of drugs in the locations the dog sniffed was at least .3175. Thus, the handler apparently used the dog to sniff a vehicle only after there were other indications of possible involvement of the driver in drug-related activity.
The fact that the dog's specificity (θ = .57) was below .60 implies that at least 40% of vehicles without drugs that are subjected to a dog sniff will receive a full search. When the prevalence of drugs in vehicles that are subject to a dog sniff is around one-third, over 65% of the vehicles screened will not contain drugs, so slightly over one-fourth of all the vehicles the dog sniffs will needlessly undergo a full search. These conclusions contrast with the earlier calculations, which assumed that both accuracy rates of the dog were high and a low prevalence of drugs in the vehicles he screened and were based on the reported PVP. This second calculation uses the information about the fraction (.3968) of dog sniffs where the dog did not alert, which was not considered in the previous one. 38 . From the last equation in (3) the term θ(1-π) = .2875 -(1-θ). Substituting this in the first equality, yields π-πη-(1-θ) = .1093. Replacing πη by its value .3175 leads to π+θ = 1.4268.
Because there are multiple solutions of equations (3) or (4), one can obtain a large number of solutions fitting three proportions summarizing the information in Nguyen. For example if the prevalence is .40, the sensitivity equals .75 and the specificity is .50, the fraction screened that are true positives (πη) = .30, the fraction screened that the dog alerts incorrectly = .30 and the PVP is .50. These figures are quite consistent with the data, πη = .3175, (1-π)*(1-θ) = .2875 and a PVP = .526 or 52.6%. Thus, a dog with unimpressive accuracy rates used to sniff vehicles and locations with a high prevalence of contraband can have a PVP of .50, which is usually accepted in cases. In sum, the information reported in Nguyen does not allow us to confidently determine the three relevant parameters. In Part II.C below, it will be seen that this is a fairly common problem.
The estimated specificity of .57 of the dog in Nguyen may be an underestimate as dogs are trained to detect the scent of marijuana or other drugs, which may remain in a vehicle or container after the drugs are removed. Thus, a dog's specificity for detecting the odor of marijuana will be higher than his specificity for detecting they are currently in the vehicle. The prevalence of drugs in the items sniffed will also increase because it now refers to the fraction of items the dog examined that have or recently had drugs. The Nguyen opinion reports that in many instances when an indication was given but no drugs were found a note is included mentioning that the person whose car was identified was a drug user or dealer, so the dog probably detected a residual odor. The opinion does not give the number of reports with such an annotation. If half of the 54 indications given by the dog were to vehicles that recently contained marijuana, then the number of indications of no drugs would remain at 75, but the number of indications of cars that recently had drugs would be 60+27 = 87 while the number of false indications would become 27. If it is assumed that the dog's sensitivity = .95, similar calculations yield a prevalence of .4845 and a specificity θ = .723. Notice that the specificity of the dog has increased by about 15%-but the prevalence, which now refers to the current or recent presence of drugs in the vehicles the dog sniffed, would increase to just under one-half.
If the PVP of a dog sniff is considered when courts assess whether the facts of a case satisfy the legal concept of "probable cause," the mathematical results in Part I above imply that even if one screens a very low prevalence population with an accurate test (here, a well-trained narcotics dog) the fraction of those identified for further testing that will be guilty of carrying contraband will be low. Unless there is some extra information suggesting the presence of contraband, as in Nguyen, the prevalence of illegal drugs in cars stopped for a traffic violation is likely to be so low that the PVP is likely to be well under 50%. As noted previously even in the low prevalence setting, the fraction of vehicles or items the dog has alerted on containing drugs may be a substantial multiple of the baseline prevalence of drugs. Nevertheless, unless the dog has a high specificity, a large majority of the searches will not find contraband. It is unclear from the data reported in the cases read by the author that report fairly high "accuracy" rates for narcotics dogs whether the police officers used some "extra knowledge" about the likelihood the driver was involved with drugs when deciding which cars to have their dog sniff.
These results also raise questions about the "accuracy" results reported by trainers of dogs when they claim "accuracy" rates over 90%. Such a high PVP occurs when a population with a high prevalence of the trait screened for is examined. It appears that trainers do more tests of the dogs on cars and locations where drugs have been placed; therefore, the trainers may be more concerned with ensuring that their dogs have a high sensitivity and detect the contraband. If this is the case, the critics are properly concerned with the fact that many innocent individuals are having their vehicles checked by narcotics dogs as the specificity of the dog identifications may not be receiving sufficient attention in the dog certification process. This is quite important because the accuracy of "nonidentifications" in the field is not checked. Indeed, the results in Table 1 concerning the prevalence of the trait amongst those who screened negative is less than the prevalence of the trait in the population. For example, from Table 1 , it can be seen that in a screen of a population with a prevalence of .05 or 5% with a test with sensitivity .99 and specificity .97, the PVN of .0054 implies that true positives will only form about one-half of 1% of those who screened negative. Because searching the vehicle of someone, say a randomly chosen member the population driving safely, for whom one does not even have a reasonable suspicion, much less "probable cause" would usually be a violation of that individual's Fourth Amendment rights, then surely searching the cars of a subpopulation (those the dog sniff did not identify) having a much lower probability of containing a contraband logically would be a greater violation of their protection against unreasonable search.
C. The Adequacy or Inadequacy of the Data Often Submitted in Legal Cases
As demonstrated in the analysis of the data concerning the accuracy of the narcotics dog in Nguyen, the same numerical value of the PVP or proportion of alerts that led to the finding of drugs may arise in noticeably different settings, depending on the prevalence of contraband in the vehicles the dog has searched and the sensitivity and specificity of the particular dog. Thus, it is worthwhile to review the data concerning the accuracy of the narcotics dog and relevant information on the prevalence of drugs in other cases relying on dog sniffs. The Stevens case is the only one with sufficient information to estimate the sensitivity and specificity of the narcotics dog, while the information in the data the state provided in Jardines was minimal.
Wisconsin v. Stevens
39
After stopping Stevens's vehicle for incomplete stops at two stop signs around 10pm one evening, the deputy decided to give the driver a warning but 39 also asked about drug and alcohol use. Then the deputy walked his dog around the car and the dog alerted to narcotics at the passenger door seam. A subsequent search of the car led to the discovery of contraband.
At a hearing, the deputy did not know the training the dog received but stated that he gave the dog 320 training sessions. In 523 tests of detecting hidden drugs, the dog found all of them, suggesting the dog had virtually perfect sensitivity. The deputy had walked the dog around 467 "clean" vehicles but did not know the number of times the dog gave an alert when it should not have. In the field, the dog had searched 12 indoor locations, 4 outdoor places, and 281 vehicles. The dog alerted 96 times and was correct 85 times, resulting in a PVP of 88.5%. Although the training session data does not allow us to estimate the dog's specificity, his sensitivity was perfect; so it will be assumed η = .98, to allow for the possibility of an error in the field because πη = 85/297 = .2862, π = .2920. Solving either one of the equations corresponding to (3) for this data yields specificity (θ) of .948. 40 Thus, the data is consistent with a dog having high sensitivity and specificity screening locations with a fairly high prevalence of drugs. Notice that the training data here provided a good estimate of the dog's sensitivity so the equations in (3) essentially had only two unknowns (π and θ). However, without this information on the dog's sensitivity, one could find many other solutions of (3) that would be consistent with the performance data.
Wisconsin v. Miller
41
Police found marijuana during a search of the first floor of a duplex for which they had a warrant. One of the officers told the handler of Cora, a trained narcotics dog, to walk around the cars parked nearby. The dog alerted and the officer let the dog sniff the inside of the car, as the car was unlocked. The dog alerted to a purse where marijuana was found. The owner of the car was found guilty of possessing a controlled substance and appealed her conviction on the grounds that the search of her car and purse violated the Fourth Amendment.
The handler of the dog stated that the dog had carried out over 100 searches. Cora had alerted 40 times and in 35 of them drugs had been found, resulting in a PVP of 87.5%. The court found that this record was sufficient to support the reliability of the dog and that its alert gave the officers "probable cause" to search the car.
In contrast to the previous case, no data on the dog's performance in training sessions is provided and only a lower bound to the number of searches she carried out is given. If it is assumed that Cora made 120 searches, then she alerted in one-third of them. With this data, the equations in (3) become πη = 35/120 = .2917, π(1-η) + (1-π)θ = .6667 and (1-π)(1-θ) = .0417. Assuming the dog's sensitivity is very high, η = .98, then π = .2977, it implies that about 30% of the locations she searched had contraband. From the third equation, one finds that the specificity θ is .9406. These values are quite similar to those of the previous case. Now let us assume that Cora had conducted 160 searches. The three equations would become: πη = 35/160 = .21875, π(1-η) + (1-π)θ = .75 and (1-π)(1-θ) = .03125. Assuming the sensitivity of .98, it implies that the prevalence of drugs in the items the dog searched was .2232, and her specificity equaled .95977 ~ .960. While the specificities are similar the prevalence of contraband in the items the dog must have searched changed substantially. This result is somewhat troublesome as there should only be a common prevalence, although granted it will be an average value for all the searches the dog made. Now assume that the prevalence of drugs in the 160 searches was .30, so Cora's sensitivity is obtained from .3η = .21875. Her sensitivity would then decline to .729, just under 75%, while her specificity would be .955. Thus, the data in Miller appear to be consistent with quite different scenarios. This illustrates the need for courts to require more complete information concerning the dog's performance in the field and in the training sessions conducted by her handler under the supervision of the Department.
Harris v. Florida
42
In July 2006, after an officer lawfully stopped a truck because the license had expired, a narcotics dog gave an alert to the door handle on the driver's side. Many pseudoephedrine pills used to make the drug methamphetamine (meth) were subsequently found under the driver's seat. The question in the case concerns how to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle based on a drug-detection dog's alert. Before describing the information the state provided, an unusual aspect of the case should be noted. The same officer stopped Mr. Harris for a driving infraction two months later. The same dog, Aldo, alerted again; however, illegal substances were not found in the subsequent search.
The dog, Aldo completed a 120 hour drug detection course in January 2004 and shortly afterwards was certified to detect several narcotics, including meth. He was not trained to detect alcohol or pseudoephedrine. Although meth is made from pseudoephedrine no testimony was presented demonstrating that a dog trained to detect meth would also detect its precursor. The dog began working with the police officer in July 2005 and completed a forty-hour training seminar in February 2006. The officer testified that he trains with Aldo four hours every week by taking him to a wrecker yard and planting drugs in six or eight out of ten vehicles. When the dog gives a correct alert, he is rewarded. The officer described the dog's alert record as "really good," but the dog's performance was only rated satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the officer did not explain whether a satisfactory rating considers the number of incorrect alerts to vehicles where drugs were not placed.
With respect to the dog's performance in the field, only Aldo's successes were recorded. One cannot determine the dog's PVP as false alerts are unknown. The state argued that records of field performance are meaningless because the dog can alert to residual odors. The opinion noted that this also raises concerns about whether an alert by a dog indicates a fair probability that drugs are present in the vehicle. 43 While the information the state provided does not enable us to estimate the three basic parameters determining the accuracy of a dog sniff or other screening test, the case raises several statistical issues. First, the dog was trained by the officer in situations where the prevalence of drugs was quite high, 60 to 80%. This suggests that the dog will have a high PVP, the commonly used indicator of accuracy, even if the dog gives a fair percentage of false alerts. To see this, assume that the prevalence of drugs in the vehicles the officer uses for training is .70 and the dog has a sensitivity of .95 and specificity of .80. 44 In this situation, formula (1) yields a PVP of .917 or 91.7% on the training data, which seems quite reassuring.
Statisticians would also question the design of the training sessions because the handler of the dog knows which vehicles have drugs. It would be better if some other officer-examiner placed the drugs in a randomly chosen number of vehicles. If there are usually ten vehicles available, the external examiner could choose a random integer and place drugs in between one and nine of them. The handler would then be "blinded" about where the drugs are and one would obtain information on both the dog's sensitivity and specificity. 45 Because the defendant was originally stopped for driving with expired tags, one expects that the prevalence of drugs in such vehicles would be rather low. To be "statistically conservative" assume the prevalence of drugs in vehicles stopped for routine infractions was 10%. Again, assuming the dog has 43 . Id. at 762-64. If a state argues that the accuracy of the dog should be based on its detecting items that currently or recently contained contraband, the same model described here would apply; only the specificity and prevalence would be higher. The PVP, however, would describe the proportion of alerts on items that have or recently had contraband. However, it is an overestimate of the proportions of alerts that would lead to the finding of drugs. From the data available in most cases, including Harris, if one desired to estimate the PVP of a dog alerting when drugs are or were recently in the item sniffed, the same mathematical issue described here would occur. One still could not estimate the three parameters, prevalence, sensitivity and specificity from the data typically submitted.
44. This means that if a vehicle contains drugs, the dog will correctly alert 95% of the time but will give an alert on 20% of the cars without drugs.
45. As noted in Section 8.6 of the guidelines for evaluating diagnostic tests issued by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA): "The user of the investigational diagnostic device should not be aware of (and so should be masked to) the result from the clinical reference standard or the results from other diagnostic evaluations, and vice versa." FOOD AND sensitivity equal to .95 and specificity .80, formula (1) yields a PVP of .3456, or just over one-third. This means that nearly two-thirds of the vehicles searched after an alert by the dog will be drug-free. If the prevalence of drugs in drivers stopped for relatively minor violations was 1%, the PVP would decline to .046, so only 5% of vehicles searched would have drugs. Whether a full search of a subpopulation of items in which only 5% contain drugs, implying that 95% of the individuals whose property is searched are innocent, is a legal or public policy question, rather than a statistical one.
The above analysis justifies the Florida Supreme Court's concerns about the implications of the missing information about the dog's field performance. In low prevalence situations, a dog with a high sensitivity and a reasonable, but not exceptional, specificity, a large majority of the alerts the dog makes will be erroneous. Even when officers and courts have a reasonable idea of the prevalence of drugs in the context of the case under review, the PVP cannot be calculated without knowing the sensitivity and specificity. 46 Unfortunately, in Harris as in most cases, the state provides virtually no information about the specificity of the dog.
Jardines v. Florida
47
This case concerns the propriety of a warrantless "sniff test" by a drug detection dog on the front porch of a home, a place where citizens have a greater expectation of privacy than when driving on public roads, after the police received an unverified "crime stoppers" tip. The opinion in Harris refers to the special concurrence of Judge Lewis and two colleagues in Jardines that cited J.L. v. State, 48 which held that an anonymous tip cannot be the sole basis for reasonable suspicion and was insufficient to justify a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment.
About a month after receiving the tip, a detective went to the home at 7 a.m. on December 6, 2006, and watched it for 15 minutes. Then the dog handler arrived with Franky. The handler and the dog went up to the front door of the home and the dog alerted to the scent of contraband. The detective then went to the door for the first time and smelled marijuana. This information was used to support an application for a search warrant that was issued. The subsequent search confirmed that marijuana was being grown inside the home and the defendant was arrested. 46 . In cases where a dog sniff is used after the police learn that the driver had a drug-related criminal record, which he did not disclose when asked and refused to provide details about the ownership of the van, e.g., Laime v.State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (Ark. 2001) or receive a tip from an informant having a good track record, the prevalence of drugs would be quite high. Similarly, drivers who have an outstanding warrant for previous criminal activity, are more likely to have contraband in their vehicles, e.g. United States v. Adams, 110 F.3d 31, 32 (8th Cir. 1997). In these situations an alert by a dog with sensitivity .95 and specificity .80 will have a reasonable PVP, for example, if the prevalence is .30, the PVP is 67.1%, so one expects contraband will be in twothirds of the vehicles the dog identified. The officer's affidavit submitted to support the request for a search warrant described the record of the dog, Franky. The dog had been used for narcotics detection about 656 times. He positively alerted on about 399 occasions. These positive alerts resulted in the seizure of a substantial amount of cocaine, heroin, meth and marijuana. Notice that this limited information does not enable one to calculate the PVP, which requires the number of alerts that were correct or that drugs were found in the subsequent search, out of the 399. Thus, the only solid information is the fraction (257/656 = .392) of sniffs the dog made that did not result in a search. This means that only one of the three equations has been given in (3) to determine the values of the three fundamental parameters. That equation is (1-π)(1-θ) = .392. Notice that no information is provided about the sensitivity of the dog, either in the field or in training sessions. While the total amount of contraband found suggests the dog had a reasonably high sensitivity, one does not know whether the dog was involved with a few searches that led to major confiscation of illegal drugs or many searches where small or moderate amounts were found. The information only allows us to calculate the specificity given the prevalence, that is, θ = 1-.392/(1-π) or the prevalence given the specificity of the dog, that is, π = 1-.392/(1-θ). For example, if the prevalence = .1, the specificity is only .566, implying that the dog will alert on about 44% of individuals without contraband, who will then be subject to a full search. If the dog had been mainly used in situations where there is a tip or other information, then the prevalence could be higher, say .30. However, the specificity would be only .44, and it would misclassify a high proportion (56%) of individuals whose belongings searched did not have contraband. Furthermore, the specificity cannot be more than .608, 49 which is not very impressive. It is clear that the amount of data concerning the dog's accuracy in Jardines is quite minimal, less than that in Nguyen and noticeably less than in Wisconsin v. Stevens, where information on the dog's sensitivity from the training sessions was available. The limited data in Jardines raises an interesting question relating to the Daubert 50 criteria for scientific evidence. Can the government use a method to identify contraband whose accuracy rates are not known; especially when the relevant data could have been collected and made available? Had the fraction of alerts that led to the finding of drugs been reported, his PVP would be known. Had his training performance been recorded, information about his sensitivity and possibly specificity would be known. Furthermore, by more careful recording of the circumstances of each search, one could make a reasonable estimate of the proportion of "false posi-tives" that arose from the dog's searching vehicles and places that recently contained contraband.
D. The Need to Distinguish the PVP Determined from the Dog's Field Performance Record and the One Appropriate to the Specific Case
The analysis of the data in Wisconsin v. Stevens estimated a prevalence of drugs in 29.2% of the items the dog searched. While it is possible that most of the searches the dog carried out prior to the case occurred after there were other indications that drugs were present, consistent with a prevalence of 29.2%, it is doubtful that the prevalence of drugs in cars stopped for failure to stop at two stop signs is that high. This implies that the PVP of 88.5% calculated previously might not be appropriate to the facts in Stevens. To determine the PVP for a particular case one needs to know the prevalence of drugs in vehicles in similar situations. For illustrative purposes, let us assume that π = .05 or one in twenty cars going thru two stop signs at that time of day have drugs in them. Then the PVP obtained from (1) is 51.3%, which previous cases indicate suffices to meet the probable cause standard. If the prevalence of drugs in cars stopped for similar offenses at around 10 pm were only .01 or one in a hundred; the PVP would only be 16.8%. Thus, one would expect only one in six searches to find drugs. Nonetheless, courts might consider one-sixth as a "fair probability"; especially as the prevalence of drugs in cars the dog gave an alert would be .168 or 16.8 times the assumed prevalence in cars stopped for similar infractions.
On the other hand, if the prevalence of cars stopped for similar traffic violations in the area was .001, substituting the values .98 and .948 for the sensitivity and specificity of the dog in formula (1) yields a PVP of .0185 or less than 2%. It is doubtful that one could justify such a low value as a "fair probability," although it might justify a "reasonable suspicion."
While it might be difficult to make a precise estimate of the prevalence of contraband in similar situations, if the sensitivity and specificity of the dog were known from certification and training records, only a reasonable approximation would suffice to see whether the case specific PVP yielded a value exceeding 10%, say. By more careful record keeping, Police Departments should be able to provide a reasonable estimate of the proportion of cars stopped for similar violations that a narcotics dog made an alert on and the fraction of these where drugs were found. Also, data on recent drug usage in the geographic area should provide an estimate of their prevalence in the community.
Similar considerations may apply to the facts in Harris v. Florida as the defendant was originally stopped for driving with expired tags. This violation does not seem related to being involved with drugs as ordinary people forget to renew their registrations on time. Thus, the prevalence of drugs in such vehicles is likely to be rather low. To be "statistically conservative" assume the prevalence of drugs in vehicles stopped for routine infractions was 10%. Again, assuming the dog has sensitivity equal to .95 and specificity .80, for-mula (1) yields a PVP of .3456, or just over one-third. This means that nearly two-thirds of the vehicles searched after an alert by the dog will be drug-free. If the prevalence of drug possession in drivers stopped for relatively minor violations was 1%, the PVP would decline to .046, so only 5% of vehicles searched would have drugs. Whether a full search of a subpopulation where only five percent of their vehicles or other items contain drugs, implying that 95 percent of the individuals whose property is searched are innocent, is a legal question, rather than a statistical one.
The above analysis justifies the Florida Supreme Court's concerns about the implications of the missing information about the dog's field performance. In low prevalence situations, a dog with a high sensitivity and a reasonable, but not exceptional, specificity, a large majority of the alerts the dog makes will be erroneous. Even when it is possible for officers and courts to have a reasonable idea of the prevalence of drugs, the PVP cannot be calculated without knowing the sensitivity and specificity. 51 Unfortunately, in Harris as in most cases, the state provides virtually no information about the specificity of the dog.
A reviewer noted that allowing police officers to incorporate case specific background information could introduce undesirable subjectivity such as racial profiling into the determination of probable cause. Thus, it is important to require these assessments to be based on relevant data and facts, rather than subjective impressions.
III. A SIMPLE COST-BENEFIT MODEL FOR INCORPORATING THE CONTEXT INTO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PVP
It may be helpful to review the use of diagnostic tests in the context of screening in a medical context before turning to the legal application. In the mid-1980s when screening blood donations for antibodies to the HIV virus was initiated there were many false positives because the prevalence of HIV in the general population was extremely low. One study reported that of 211 blood donors who repeatedly tested positive on the ELISA screening test, only 9 of the 102 males and none of the 109 females were classified as having the HIV virus by the confirmatory test. 52 Because the fraction of true positives was so small, the blood banks decided not to inform individuals who tested positive. Of course, blood that tested positive was not used in transfusion. In this application, the authorities weighed the cost of discarding the small fraction of blood that screened positive (probably less than 1%) even if less than 5% of that blood was infected against the risk (less than 5%) of giving tainted blood to a patient. Because such a small fraction of blood donations that tested positive truly were positive, the authorities had to weigh the cost of telling individ- uals they might have a deadly disease when only a small percentage did and causing substantial concern against the cost of identifying the few who did have it at a time when effective treatments had not been developed.
In the context of dog sniffs of vehicles or luggage there are also trade-offs, which can be expressed as expected costs or gains. These costs and gains probably depend on the particular contraband screened for. The gain to society as a whole from identifying someone with the contraband is N .
As before, the prevalence of the trait in the population screened is π, η is the sensitivity of the test, N the size of the population and is the gain per person from detecting and presumably punishing the possessor of the contraband. The cost to society of carrying out the screening is the cost (C) of screening and the extra cost to those who are falsely identified in terms of time and perhaps a short period of stress. This second cost is N , were θ is the specificity of the dog. This cost is the fraction of the population who are innocent, N(1-π) times their probability of being searched (1-θ) because the dog has imperfect sensitivity and the value of the inconvenience to them. When deciding whether a population of N should be screened, which would cost C, essentially one is asking whether N is sufficiently greater than C + N .
While the cost C of carrying out the screening program is relatively easy to determine, the other two costs may not be. People may give different values to the gain to society of putting someone in jail regardless of whether that person simply uses marijuana or is a dealer. After 9/11, in the context of catching someone with explosives or anthrax, most people would assign a much higher value to than in the marijuana context. 53 The cost will include the nature and extent of the intrusion on the Fourth Amendment Rights of those searched. When using dogs to sniff individuals or homes, the cost will be greater than in the searches of vehicles lawfully stopped for a traffic violation as it needs to incorporate the loss to society of the greater expectation of privacy people have when in their homes. 54 More generally, the relative values of the various costs should reflect the principles and needs of the soci- ety at large. Notice that the two measures of accuracy and the prevalence are components of formula (5) and that is multiplied by a factor that increases as the prevalence or specificity become smaller.
The importance of the prevalence in assessing the cost-effectiveness of a drug search or screening program is reflected in inequality (5). When the prevalence, π, is low, for example, .001 number of individuals identified, the term Nπη in (5), is likely to be relatively small, unless is very large. In this situation, if the dog or screening test does not have a high specificity, the gain (left side of (5)) may well be less than the cost to society (right side of (5)).
IV. DISCUSSION
The purpose of this article is to describe the proper measures of accuracy of a screening test, for example, a dog sniff for drugs or explosives, and the data required to assess the accuracy and reliability of those tests or dog sniffs. The screening tests' role in the decision on when to use dog sniffs is formulated in terms of the various costs involved. In many cases, both advocates and courts have thought that the PVP identification is the sensitivity of the dog or the probability that if drugs are in the car or area searched then the dog will detect them. It is shown that a relatively low PVP may well occur when screening a low prevalence population with an accurate test (both sensitivity and specificity are high). The relative costs of failing to detect a carrier of contraband or erroneously searching the vehicle of an innocent person will vary according the risk to the public of nondetection and the inconvenience to and possible embarrassment of law abiding citizens in the particular context. Balancing these costs should assist the public and its representatives to decide when the use of a screening test, for example, a dog sniff for a particular contraband is justified. As noted by the late Professor Stuntz, current Fourth Amendment law is transsubstantive, so applying the same standard in virtually all cases.
55 Equation (5) in Part III and the related discussion may be regarded as a starting point for formulating his observation that "[r]easonableness here, as elsewhere in law, requires a balance of gains and losses, benefits and costs." 56 The above considerations indicate that the legal term "probable cause" may not have a single numerical value for the "probability a criminal act occurred" that is applicable in all legal settings. Rather, it should be interpreted in the context of the risk to society and the inconvenience to individuals relevant to the specific situation. This is consistent with the Court's statement that "Probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily or evenly usefully reduced to a neat set of legal rules." 57 Chief Justice Marshall who interpreted probable cause as meaning less evidence than would justify condemnation but sufficient to warrant suspicion. While the Court does not feel that "probable cause" is as finely tuned a standard as "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "preponderance of the evidence," 59 the probabilistic framework presented here hopefully will assist courts in obtaining the data needed to estimate the accuracy of dog identifications. Currently, the information concerning the accuracy of narcotics dogs submitted by the state in many cases is inadequate to determine the two standard measures of accuracy of a screening test. As exemplified in the analysis of the available data in Nguyen, the same PVP could arise when the dog had high values of both sensitivity and specificity or when his specificity was low, but the prevalence of drugs in the vehicles the dog searched was relatively high. Furthermore, the data submitted to support the dog's accuracy in Jardines is not only inadequate for estimating the dog's sensitivity and PVP, it also implies that at least 40% of the items of innocent individuals sniffed by the dog will be incorrectly identified as containing contraband.
A statistical examination of several certification standards in Appendix B shows that the sample sizes are too small to provide a sound estimate of the dog's sensitivity, which is the primary focus of the certification process. The usual certification tests do not collect much information on the dog's specificity. Thus, even if dogs were required to search a larger number of vehicles or locations, data from the certification process cannot be relied on to provide reliable estimates of both accuracy measures. Another problem arises because the dogs apparently are examined and trained in situations where the prevalence of drugs is high, 60 while they are often employed in a low prevalence context, for example, checking vehicles after a relatively minor traffic violation.
As seen in Wisconsin v. Stevens, when reliable data on the dog's sensitivity are obtained from training and certification studies and full information is recorded on the dog's performance in the field, one can estimate the three basic parameters on which the accuracy of any screening test depends. In the future it would be helpful if courts ensure that the training and certification data on both the sensitivity and specificity of the dog are obtained in "blind" tests so that the accuracy of a dog or a forensic method can be evaluated. sniffs or other forensic techniques in the many different contexts in which they are used.
Finally, it is interesting to contrast the fairly strict examination courts give expert testimony from social science, natural science and related fields 63 after the Daubert decision with the comparatively relaxed examination of the data submitted to support the accuracy of dog sniffs in cases concerning whether "probable cause" existed at the time of the search. The "probable cause" inquiry is a legal one, so the circumstances surrounding the events in question as well as the information related to the dog's accuracy is submitted to judges, while the Daubert criteria are used to prescreen evidence submitted to a jury. Although judges have more experience evaluating scientific evidence than most jurors, so different criteria might be applicable in the two contexts, the persistence of the use of an incorrect measure of a narcotic dog's accuracy for many years suggests that courts might benefit from a minimal standard of reliability for scientific evidence for cases that do not go to juries.
As demonstrated here, the usual statistic presented to summarize a dog's field performance is inadequate for reliably estimating the basic quantities needed to evaluate the accuracy of a dog. In the typical certification process illegal drugs are placed in four to twelve locations or vehicles. A statistical examination of the typical certification and training procedures focus only on the dog's sensitivity to contraband and as shown in Appendix B samples of size twelve are too small to provide a sound estimate of that sensitivity, much less the specificity of the dog. As noted in the discussion of Wisconsin v. Stevens in Part II, in conjunction with the records of the training or practice sessions the narcotics dog has with his handler, one should be able to obtain a reasonably accurate estimate of the dog's sensitivity. 64 Then one can use the field performance data to solve the equations in (3) for the specificity of the dog and the prevalence of contraband in the items screened. This would provide courts with sufficient information to assess whether an alert from the dog involved was sufficiently accurate for the officer to have probable cause. This may depend on the likely prevalence of contraband in situations similar to the case, for example, an alert by dog with high sensitivity and specificity would be sufficient in general but an alert by a dog with a lower specificity might only suffice in a moderate to high prevalence setting.
Shortly after the article was accepted for publication, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Harris 65 and Jardines. 66 A brief description of the opinions and their relationship to the considerations discussed here are given in Appendix C. 
67
Around 10:00 pm on December 2005, the defendant was stopped by a policeman after he made incomplete stops at two stop signs. The defendant denied that there were drugs or alcohol in the car, but the deputy walked his K-9 drug dog around the vehicle. The dog indicated an odor of narcotics and the deputy followed up, without defendant's consent, and discovered contraband.
As noted in the discussion of the case, the dog identified all 523 searches for hidden narcotics when narcotics were present in the training test vehicle or location. However, the officer did not recall the number of alerts the dog gave when tested on 467 "clean" vehicles. The deputy noted that in his career the dog searched 281 vehicles and 16 other locations; giving 96 alerts, 85 of which led to the discovery of narcotics. The proportion, 85/96 = .885, of correct alerts is the PVP and was offered by the state to substantiate the dog's accuracy.
The brief then makes a calculation similar to those described in Part I. First, the prevalence of drugs in cars is estimated as the percentage of drug arrests divided by the number of registered vehicles. This value is only .32%.
68
The brief then assumes that the .885 is the sensitivity and the specificity of the test. Substituting these values into the formula (1), the authors obtain a PVP of 2.41%. Then they argue that "there was a 2.41% chance that Stevens' vehicle actually contained drugs, when based solely on the dog's rendering an alert."
69
The brief includes a table similar to Table 1 using .885 as the sensitivity and specificity of the dog's identification.
While a PVP of only 2.41% might be considered too small to justify searching a car, the calculation is based on a rough estimate of the prevalence as well as incorrect values of the sensitivity and specificity. If one uses the value, .0032, for the prevalence estimated by the authors 70 and assumes that the two accuracy rates, sensitivity and specificity are equal, one can use formula (1) to calculate the common value of these rates from the observed PVP of 88.5%. One obtains an estimated sensitivity of .9958. It is doubtful that even a well-trained dog would have both accuracy rates that high. This suggests that the prevalence of drugs in vehicles that are stopped by the police in 67. Grant County Brief, supra note 39. The brief was filed by the lawyers, Tom Kelly and Suzanne Edwards.
68. The brief correctly notes that not all arrests for drugs involved traffic stops, which suggests that the .32% figure is an overestimate. Id. at 8. The denominator, however, is likely to be too large as many drivers will not run two stop signs. Ideally, the denominator would be the number of cars or drivers involved in a violation.
69. Id. 70. The brief uses the ratio of the total drug violations to the number of registered vehicles in the county as the prevalence. Id. Implicitly, this assumes that all drivers have the same probability of having drugs in their cars and the same probability of making two incomplete stops, very close in time.
the County for traffic violations is higher than the estimate used by the authors. Even assuming a higher prevalence, say .05, of drugs in cars officers stop for traffic violations, the same calculation yields an estimated sensitivity and specificity of .944 for the dog. These calculations follow the brief's assumption that the sensitivity and specificity of the dog were equal. Under that assumption, for prevalence in the range of .003 to .05, the dog in the Stevens case appears to have performed quite accurately. Furthermore, the lawyers who authored the brief did not consider the perfect sensitivity the dog had in training.
The situation in Stevens again illustrates that when an accurate screening test, for example, a dog sniff is used to screen a population with a very low prevalence of the trait screened for the PVP will be small. The dog's accuracy is reflected in the increased prevalence (2.41%) of drugs in amongst cars identified, which is seven and one-half times the prevalence, .32% of drugs the lawyers estimated in all drivers.
APPENDIX B. Statistical Aspects of a Scent Detection Certification Process 71
In the certification process the dog and handler examine three indoor rooms and four vehicles for drugs. Two of the three rooms and two of the four vehicles contain drugs. No more than one find (drug) will be in a room or vehicle. In each of the location types, one find will be a soft drug (marijuana) and the other a hard drug (cocaine). Thus, drugs should be detected in two of the three rooms and two of the four vehicles. To be certified, the K-9 team must locate three of the four finds, that is, a success rate (sensitivity) of at least 75% is required. The proportion of false positives, needed to estimate the dog's specificity is not recorded and no minimum upper bound for the fraction of false positives is mentioned.
While the dog is being tested on both hard and soft drugs, there are several potential problems with the system. First, the prevalence of drugs in both locations is high (66.7% in the rooms and 50% in vehicles). Second, the number of finds in each type of location is known to the handler. 72 If after sniffing the first three vehicles, the dog has alerted on two, the fourth vehicle might not be examined by the dog. This may be a reasonable procedure in some situations, for example, when the police are investigating a tip informing them of a parking lot where the cars of one or two drug dealers are located, but it does 71 not seem to fit the more common situation where a car is examined after a traffic violation. Third the sample size is small, implying that an estimated sensitivity of .75 has a noticeable "sampling error" attached to it.
To appreciate the implications of the small number of hides, recall that an estimate of a mean or proportion is accompanied by a confidence interval, which reports a range of values of the true mean or proportion that are consistent with the observations. Often they are symmetric about the point estimate; however, for this problem it is appropriate to consider a one-sided lower confidence interval for the sensitivity. This is because high confidence is needed, so that the sensitivity is at least a reasonably high value, for example, 80%. For a narcotics dog identifying three of the four finds, the 95 (90) % confidence intervals for sensitivity are (.25, 1.0) and (.32, 1.0). Thus, 3 of 4 finds only tells us that high confidence can be had that the sensitivity of the dog is at least .32 or 32%, which is clearly very low. Even for a dog identifying all four finds, the corresponding 95 (90) % confidence intervals are (.475, 1) and (.565, 1). Thus, one only has 90% confidence that a dog with a perfect four out of four certification performance has a specificity of at least 56.5%.
There are some agencies with a more stringent requirement. 73 One uses 10 samples of drugs and requires the dog find at least 9. Another requires the dog to locate at least 11 of 12. Consider the certification process placing ten finds in a number of locations. For a dog identifying all ten, one would have 90% confidence that their sensitivity is at least .795, nearly 80%. If the dog identified nine of the ten finds, the lower end of a 90% confidence interval would be .664 or just below two-thirds.
For the certification process requiring the dog find at least 11 of 12 hidden drug samples, the lower limit of the 90 (95) % confidence intervals for the sensitivity of the dog are .713 and .6614, respectively. Thus, one can only have a reasonably high degree of confidence that a dog meeting those requirements has a sensitivity of about 70%. That testing procedure also includes one blank hide in addition to the 12 with drugs but the requirement is no more than one false negative.
The procedures used in training and certifying narcotics could produce more reliable estimates of the dog's sensitivity and specificity if the forensic community adopted the principles used in the medical and public health field. 74 Of primary importance is the use of "masked" or "blinded" studies. For example, in the certification process, the analog of a "double blind" study would have someone other than the evaluator or handler place the contraband in the locations to be searched. Then both the handler being tested and the evaluator who determines when the dog alerts would not know which locations contained contraband. Similarly, in some of the training sessions, someone other than the handler could decide which of the vehicles or locations will 73. Id. at 19. 74. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN, supra note 45, for the FDA guidelines. It should be noted that the usefulness of "blind" studies as a starting point is mentioned in guidelines for detector dogs produced for the Department of Justice. FURTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 4.
The accuracy of the narcotics dog did not play a role in the 5-4 decision in Jardines. The majority noted that previous cases held that the porch that was "sniffed" enjoys the same Fourth Amendment protection as the house itself and that the investigation was an unlicensed intrusion on the home. Three judges wrote a special concurrence indicating that in addition to the property grounds, the officers also invaded the "reasonable expectation of privacy" that one enjoys in their home. The dissent argued that the officers had not trespassed on the defendant's property and that the dog sniff did not violate the owners' Fourth Amendment rights.
